

The Act of Politics Is to Divide

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Things will have to take place *elsewhere, too*.

—Jacques Derrida (302; emphasis in original)

In her famous disagreement with Larry Summers about a boycott of Israeli academics and their institutions, there is one thing that Judith Butler makes resonantly clear: The act of politics is to divide. Writing of herself and like-minded Jewish “dissenters,” all of whom are committed to putting pressure on the Israeli state and those institutions that support and benefit from it, Butler argues:

[I]t is precisely as *Jews*, even in the name of a different Jewish culture, that they call for another way, that they assert their disidentification with that policy, that they assert another path for Jewish politics, they seek to widen the rift between the state of Israel and the Jewish people to produce an alternative vision. This rift is crucial for opening up and sustaining a critical relation to the state of Israel, its military power, its differential forms of citizenship, its unmonitored practices of torture, and its egregious nationalism. (Butler 114; emphasis in original)

To decide in favor of the “rift,” to advocate for “another path for Jewish politics,” is not only to understand, as is always politically necessary, the provisionality of the decision—that this, or at the very least a decision much like it, will have to be made about a similar situation, again and again—but to know that the decision is divisive. The “alternative vision,” in Butler’s explication, can only emerge out of the decision to insist on difference. The decision, as any properly political act must, divides; division is about the active splitting of the *polis*, those who “identify” and those who vigorously “disidentify.” Division pits one proposition, one mode of politics, against the other. The decision makes possible the act of deciding *for* so that there can be the founding of a solidarity which constitutes the act of standing *with*; the division makes manifest the act of standing *against*. In Slavoj Žižek’s terms, what is required is to “renounce the impossible ideal of a nonantagonistic society” (100). Division, emanating in this instance from the debate about the proposal to boycott Israeli

WORKS AND DAYS 51/52, 53/54: Vols. 26 & 27, 2008-09

universities (a movement that began in Britain in 2002 but has, long since disseminated itself, especially within the U.S. academy), declares the name—speaks the cause—of that which is no longer politically tolerable.

The concept of an academic boycott of Israeli institutions was born directly out of having reached such a point of intolerability. Writing in *The Guardian*, April 6, 2002, the first proponents of the boycott, Stephen and Hilary Rose (professors of biology and social policy at the Open University and University of Bradford, respectively), declared: “Despite widespread international condemnation for its policy of violent repression against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories, the Israeli government appears impervious to moral appeals from world leaders” (n. pag.). Like the decision by Mona Baker, inspired by the Roses’ “open letter” in *The Guardian*, to remove Israeli academics Miriam Shlesinger (Bar-Ilan University) and Gideon Toury (Tel Aviv University) from the board of the journals *Translator* and *Translation Studies Abstracts*,¹ and the campaign to get institutions to divest in Israel (a movement that generated public debate in the U.S.), the academic boycott constitutes the politics of the only viable remainder, a political undertaking that emanates from a history of failure: It is the politics of last resort, never the politics of first response. The boycott or the divestment campaign is the mode of political protest that is left after all other forms of struggle have been tried and, almost without exception, failed. Armed struggle, negotiation, and international arbitration all have been undertaken with precious little to show for it. In this way, the academic boycott, the “un-appointment” of Israeli academics, and divestment articulates itself not only as the struggle in the face of a “morally impervious” regime, but also as a history that is always connected to death, to the history of violence—especially the violence that Israel commits in the Occupied Territories.

In 2005, there was a proposal tabled at the Association of University Teachers (AUT) in Britain to boycott Haifa University (northern Israel) and Bar-Ilan (near Tel Aviv). Action against Haifa University was favored because of “charges that staff lecturers and students were being subjected to threats of dismissal if they were critical of Israeli policy” and Bar-Ilan because of Tel Aviv University’s “supportive relationship with the College of Judea and Samaria, a nearby regional college located in the highly controversial Israeli West Bank settlement of Ariel” (Gaines 70). The AUT’s position, which more or less coincided with the rise of the divestment movement in the U.S. (faculty, students, and activists organizing, similar to the anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s, to pressure U.S. universities to apply economic pressure on Israel), marks at once a specificity: the decision to publicly censure the policies of Haifa and Bar-Ilan Universities, and a more general condemnation of the Israeli state. In 2006, the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) passed a motion that called for the boycott of all Israeli academics who did not speak out against the actions of their state. A year later, the University and College Union (UCU) (created out of the AUT-NATFHE merger) tabled Motion 30, in which it condemned, among other actions, the “complicity of Israeli academia in the occupation” (“Circular UCU/31” n. pag.).

However, in September 2007, the UCU would, after receiving legal advice, effectively call off the boycott (apparently it would have been deemed “unlawful” and therefore could not be implemented). While this essay turns strategically upon the various articulations of the AUT/NATFHE/UCU event (and its transatlantic repercussions), the primary concern here is not an evaluation of the boycott as a mode of political protest as such—although there is certainly critique, implicitly as well as explicitly, of its strategic efficacy. Indeed, both the boycott and the divestment movements have had their critics from almost all points on the political spectrum. Predictably, there are right-wing pro-Israel defenders such as Alan Dershowitz and, unexpectedly, Palestinian academics (albeit a minority but one whose number includes Sari Nusseibeh, president of Al-Quds University), who see the Israeli academy as one of the few venues where peace might be discussed, if not strenuously advocated or supported. On the other hand, there are those whose ranks include the more reflective provocations of a thinker such as Noam Chomsky, who has argued that the divestment movement specifically diverts attention from what he purports is the more important project of producing a substantial change in U.S. policy toward Israel. Chomsky believes that a direct address to U.S. state policy would secure a more just resolution for the Palestinian people and attain, directly and with more lasting effect, precisely the goals that motivate and sustain the anti-Israeli boycott—the alleviation of Palestinian suffering and statehood, to mention but two. For the purposes of this essay, however, the event of the proposed boycott of Israeli academia is used as an instance through which to consider how the event inaugurated by the Roses’ letter provides the opportunity for thinking about the politics of division.

The act of (the Roses’) condemnation produced, within our contemporary, the “long moment” of academic activism for Palestinian rights: a moment that lasts from 2002 to 2009; a moment that, properly speaking, has not yet passed and can never pass until there is some form of restoration of Palestinian rights; a moment that always seems beyond the horizon of our political.² Engaging in such an “impossible” struggle is also to acknowledge that however “fortuitous” or “identifiable” the conditions for boycott movement might be, the violence of the Israeli state visited upon the Palestinian people or the construction of the wall, the impetus toward resisting and protesting Israeli state actions can never be fully anticipated, prepared for, or as importantly, accounted for. Moreover, the Roses’ public address introduced a division that makes explicit and politically resonant (so that the issue of the Palestinian people is assumed from its very 2002 utterance before its Rosean articulation to be a political issue—to have been an issue—that subsumes the decision about “academic freedom”) the deplorable condition of life for the Palestinian people. The colonialist action of Bar-Ilan, de facto supporting the ever-increasing annexation of Palestinian land, thereby making it increasingly difficult to construct a viable Palestinian state, makes relevant again (as if it could ever be “irrelevant”) the event of *al-Nakba*, the catastrophe of 1948 when the establishment of the state of Israel was made possible only because of the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians. It reminds us again of the human costs of Israel’s

determination to build the wall and returns us, once more, to everything from the routine violence against the Palestinians to the assassination attacks on any Palestinian leader who opposes Israeli violence. The decision to argue for an academic boycott means that, in Butler's terms, we have to attend—preferably, urgently—to matters that range from “differential forms of citizenship” to “unmonitored practices of torture” because of how catastrophically they impact and have impacted Palestinian lives and continue to make those lives vulnerable.

The point of politics is to divide and then to act—preferably, “antagonistically”—in the space that has been created by that division. Not a simplistic division, which is to say, in the colonialist mode of “divide and conquer” (though such a strategy is by no means without its advantages), but to carve out an opening that makes clear, axiomatically if possible, what it is that makes division the space of the irreconcilable: that is, the cause of the Palestinians against Israeli state violence is not only just or necessary, but it implicates—in Jacques Derrida's sense of that “elsewhere”—us all. Politics can only, in this and several other instances of the radical, be called “politics” if its mission is to divide and then to act in the name of that division. The moment of decision, which is undoubtedly difficult but also indisputable and absolutely necessary, marks the act of division because it announces that the battle has been joined, that sides must be taken, that the space—the division—increases proportional to the intensity of the decision. “Egregious Israeli nationalism” or Haifa University's censorious actions against those determined to protest Israeli state violence can only be met with vigorous (“antagonistic”) commitment to the inalienable right to a Palestinian state, with the repeated, nonnegotiable demand for the right of Palestinian return, and with yet another accounting (following in the tradition of scholars such as Rashid Khalidi's work) for the ethnic cleansing of 1948.

The division borne, as such, historically out of the event of *al-Nakba*, is of such a political intensity that it refuses the mere recollection or invocation of the past. *Al-Nakba* cannot be simply recalled; it must be the event that we, to phrase this awkwardly, divide ourselves against. It is to decide, based upon the politically axiomatic, that in this scenario there is a singular victim: the Palestinian, one of, if not *the* preeminent political figures of the last sixty years.

Thinking (from) “Elsewhere”

There is, of course, only an incidental commensurability between what we might label Butler's politics of the “rift” and Derrida's “elsewhere.” However, what these two modes of politics share is the promise of that other place. If the “rift” is, for Butler, a place—the place—from which speaking as a Jew against the violence of the state of Israel might take place, then there is in the “rift” the singular promise of radical solidarity and intense division; radical solidarity through division and, importantly, radical solidarity because of division. Butler's rift, the politics of division, introduces the possibility of a split or an antagonism into the decisions—might we say, every decision?—of any regime. The rift is, for this reason, a dangerous modality because it makes the decision potentially accountable to Derrida's “elsewhere” and also, importantly, to political contestation that the regime has

deemed—would like to deem, or cannot imagine as anything other than intrinsic to itself (which is to say, sovereign)—extrinsic to its political. Politics as the act of division conceived as, say, following Butler, a “different Jewish culture,” thus opens (or rather insists upon) that phenomenon we might name the space and the time of the “elsewhere”; that is, other traditions of Jewish oppositionality, of antinationalist alliances, of a politics that will not heed the call of an easy identitarianism. Even as it cannot possibly accomplish this end, the threat of politics, which also articulates its implicit promise, is that no political is ever alone unto itself so that every speaking must make allowance for a speaking to a place that is outside of itself.

In Derrida’s “Taking A Stand For Algeria,” “elsewhere” functions as nothing so much as a promissory note. Derrida’s “elsewhere” suggests that there is promise in that other place, that it is a place from which a speaking in the name of, a speaking for, is possible. For our moment, the “proposed” (since it is always in conception however much it is presumed to have failed, or to have been trumped by the law) boycott of Israeli academic institutions represents a promissory note to the Palestinians. The note reads: “You are not alone. We stand here in this other place, this place that is not yours but must, we insist, speak to you, of you, this space that will never—no matter the invectives, the accusations (especially of anti-Semitism), the many refusals—relinquish the right to speak with you, to speak when you cannot be heard, when your voice is threatened by violence and death. We are, as much as any dislocated political subject can be, on your side: We speak so that our speech might stand alongside yours. And, if necessary, because of the historical conditions that denies your speech audibility or broader public dissemination, we ask that you understand our speech as yours. Not as yours, per se, but as provisionally ‘yours.’”

In this other speaking, the other place (removed and yet intimate, this known, unknowable, critical), “elsewhere” constitutes the very core of the Butlerian “rift.” Speaking from “elsewhere” demonstrates how the problematic of speaking for demands the act of assuming the voice of the other; that particular speech act, at once the enunciation of a commitment and a historically enforced “substitution”—the act of standing in for, standing uncertainly but determinedly as—is the political moment that can never be (fully) anticipated in advance as much as it is prepared for. There is always, as it were, the “rift” between the voice of the self and the voice of the other; the recognition that speaking from here to and about “elsewhere” requires a conjugation across a political (and geographical) divide. Therein, of course, lies the risk of the “rift” and the promise: the difficulty of the impossible; the difficulty of fidelity to the o/Other’s voice; to speak the political commitment of the Self in its provisional relation to the o/Other. This is the danger of the politics of “elsewhere,” an unavoidable risk that the voice that speaks from the division is not, necessarily, the voice of the subject who “produced”—whose body lies, exposed in—the division, but a voice whose speaking must be, per force, “ventriloquized”—spoken as in the act of speaking for. The voice, perhaps no voice, can ever speak only as itself because every voice is always, in some form or other, in an address to an “elsewhere,” to a place that is not its place—there is, in every voice, in advance of itself, a division.

Thus there is always in the promise the recognition that “elsewhere” coexists with the fundamental “there” so that the promissory note addresses itself, sometimes more consciously (and conscientiously) to precisely that location. It is the speaking of history. The promissory note continues: “There is, in this place that is not yet your place but will, again, become a place for you, a future that is divided from this present. Palestine will again become the home of the Palestinian people. From this ‘elsewhere’ we say, with no guarantee but with absolute commitment, that the future is, moreover, a ‘place’—which is to say, a time to come—that we will help you make. We are acting, as Derrida might say, in response to your ‘appeal’—which is, in truth, merely our answer, our formal address, to the history of your situation.”

It is, of course, that deep sense of history that makes the promissory note to the Palestinians possible. It was through, among other strategies, the boycott of the apartheid regime that racism in South Africa was overcome—whatever the failures of the successive ANC post-apartheid governments.³ Like South Africa, the academic boycott of Israeli academic institutions is being done “elsewhere,” in the name of but not—from that other place we know as “here”—by those who are, who have been for some six decades, on the receiving end of Israeli state violence. (And, one must hasten to add, who have been the victims of an international, to a disturbing extent, indifference and, worse, inaction.) In an instance such as the Palestinian or the anti-apartheid struggles, as Derrida so aptly reminds us, “political decisions do not depend in the last instance on the citizens of this or that nation-state” (304). In many cases, the power of such a decision is precisely what is denied the “citizen”—or, for that matter, the noncitizen, or those for whom citizenship lies beyond the realm of the political imaginary. As Mohammed Abed argues, the “constant assault on the Palestinian educational sector [. . .] the use of such policies as closure, curfew, and the ‘pass system’ to place restrictions on the movements of individuals, mak[es] it difficult for Palestinian civilians to maintain their sense of community and even their family relations” (83).

That is why “elsewhere” matters. In rejecting, in struggling against the (internal) restrictions of the “nation-state,” “elsewhere” relocates the act of political decision. While “elsewhere” cannot, in every instance (or even any, some might argue) counter the immediate (which is to say, the power of localized violence) effect of (Israeli) sovereignty, it does authorize a speaking site that is not subject to that sovereignty. How can the sovereign, Israeli or any other, speak beyond itself when it cannot enforce its will? The power of “elsewhere” depends less upon its ubiquity—that is, “elsewhere” is not (unfortunately) everywhere—than upon the power of every particular “elsewhere.” (As an “elsewhere,” Chomsky would argue *inter alia* that the U.S. has greater political authority than any other “elsewhere.” The political specificity and power of the “elsewhere,” we might say, is finally what defines or demarcates such a space. It is for this reason that “elsewhere” and the specific locale have to be thought both dialogically—in concert with each other—and dissensually—as potentially antagonistic to each other.) The intention of thinking every “elsewhere” is to produce a precise, (differently) empowered “here.” The condition of Palestine or Israel must be articulated simultaneously

as an “elsewhere” (a broad-based, globally dispersed, particularly empowered and more or less united critique) and a “here” (a locale outside of the site of address, a site fashioned by the politics of the promissory note that speaks to Palestine or Israel, or for Palestine to Israel).

To speak from within the British, the European, or the U.S. academy is to speak with the authority of those places, and that is what threatens the Israeli academic system. For the Israelis, most of whom condemned the AUT’s proposal, the boycott must be countered, must be argued against because, as the South African instance revealed, the power of its impact resides in the radical possibility of (the) “elsewhere.” It is the authorial location that antagonists of the boycott, such as Martha Nussbaum (unlike Judith Butler), refuse because they will not deliberately address the power of place—the power and, we might say, the privilege of their locus of enunciation. Invoking what we might name “philosophical immunity,” “I believe that philosophers should be pursuing philosophical principles—defensible general principles that can be applied to a wide range of cases” (30), Nussbaum argues against the boycott—in its stead she offers “censure,” “organized public condemnation,” and “organized public condemnation of an individual or individuals.” Nussbaum considers it a “blunt instrument” (32), as though “blunt instruments” have no political usage or effect—as though speaking “bluntly” is not, in more instances than we care to admit, the most appropriate form of intervention. It is also to say that politically we must not only accept responsibility for how our speaking inaugurates and/or contributes to controversies, but we must also risk the possibility of initiating or deepening the division.

However, it is precisely in her insistence upon “generality” (or the “abstract”) that Nussbaum, inadvertently or not, draws attention to the particularity of the Palestinian case. “I do not plan,” Nussbaum declares, “to discuss the specific facts concerning boycotts of Israeli academic institutions and individuals” (30). Inadvertently, the question is raised, addressed not only to Nussbaum, but to us all: At what point do we “discuss the specific facts?” At what point do the “facts” dictate that speaking out is the only thing to do because the risks attendant to not speaking out are too high? Is that point still in our future or is it already fast disappearing in our rearview mirrors? At what point does not “discussing the facts” render itself indistinguishable from—effectively speaking—complicity with the Israeli state? Therein lies the paradox. It is by refusing specificity—the particular authority of the “elsewhere”—that Nussbaum and other critics of the boycott draw attention to precisely that: the particularities of Palestinian life. The violence done to Palestinians, the determination to end that violence and to secure Palestinian life and statehood, constitutes the *raison d’être* of the campaign so that there is in every articulation about the boycott already, in advance of and surviving every enunciation, the figure of Palestine and the Palestinian. Lawrence Davidson and Islah Jad in arguing for “Academic boycott as international solidarity” make, not directly in response to Nussbaum but apropos nonetheless, exactly this point: “[E]ven the efforts to discredit those who support the boycott, and to delegitimize the boycott as a strategy of protest, have unintentionally helped to provide a forum for

debating the facts about Palestine and the occupation. If the boycott achieves nothing more than this, it would have achieved a great deal" (10). The "Israeli academic institutions and individuals" that Nussbaum will not "discuss" do not need to be named in order to insert themselves into the issue of the academic boycott. That is the true force of the Palestinian: Even when the Palestinian subject is not named, it firstly haunts any conversation about Israel and more urgently reveals itself to be spectrally and politically constitutive of any utterance—any critique or defense—regarding Israel.

Moreover, within the domain of the "elsewhere" (as with almost everywhere else), the Palestinian represents—better than any other subject—the figure of the political as the act of division. The Palestinian demands not only that there be a public choice, either in favor or against the boycott (to "not discuss" is already to have made a choice, the choice that is publicly declared in that refusal), but also the recognition of the possibilities brought about by the division. In his critique of the debate about the boycott, David Storey's deliberate framing makes the terms of the division absolutely clear: "Upholding the freedom of Israeli academics needs to be set alongside the freedom of academics in Palestine. Upholding the principle for some may have a negative impact on others. It might be argued that continuing to treat Israel as a 'normal' state implicitly legitimizes Israeli state actions including its treatment of Palestinians" (994). By insisting that Israeli academic freedoms be balanced against Palestinian academic freedoms, by implying that the "facts" be properly weighed, Storey reveals precisely the truth that no critic of the Israeli boycott can argue against: that there can be, under the current dispensation that is the hegemonic Israeli state, no call for "protection" while there is violation. By disequivalencing these two "freedoms," Storey reveals how the politics of division articulates itself against any simplistic defense of "academic freedom" for its own sake—if, of course, academic freedom could ever be conceived of as a singular political mode.

Any call for the protection of Israeli academic freedom can only be deemed at best hypocritical if there is, in Newtonian terms, no "equal and opposite" demand. Freedom is set here against the non-existence of such freedom. Articulating the radical effects of the division, Storey's critique creates a provocative political space that separates Israel from its desire for "normalcy," that is, a state in moral good standing internationally; furthermore, in his sharp rhetorical move, Storey explicitly equates support for the Israeli state with condoning violence against the Palestinians. Through explicit or implicit critique, through denunciation or nuance, the division reveals its most (a)stringent political quality: its axiomatic clarity. The division offers itself as an obviousness. There can be, in the terms of the division, no demand that Israeli academics not be denied academic freedom when such freedom is routinely, violently, deliberately, and as a matter of state policy, denied to their Palestinian colleagues; when critique of the Israeli state is prohibited by the university itself; or when the university itself is an instrument and proponent of coloniality.

All of which provokes the obvious question borne out of Uri Hadar's indictment: "Israeli campuses have so far been remarkably quiet, not

only with regard to the occupation, the violation of civil rights in the territories, the economic and human degradation of Palestinians, and so on, but also regarding the undermining of Palestinian higher education" (16). Why, in other words, have Israeli academics, with rare exceptions (Ilan Pappé comes immediately to mind, before he was driven out of Haifa University for his critiques of the Israeli state), not defended the rights of Palestinian academics? Do you have the right to call for, insist upon protection for, a right you are not prepared to defend? A right you regard as inalienable to yourself but easily denied the Other? How, in this regard, can we think of not only the specificity, but also, more significantly, the philosophical value of academic freedom? What is the value of academic freedom if it is so readily divisible into Self and Other, if it is at once so defensible as a veritable call to intellectual arms, and yet so vulnerable as to be recuperable only through the division? So unthought of as to be articulated only in the midst of the threat of academic violence to the Self?

What these inquiries make evident is that on its own, acknowledged or not, academic freedom has to be conceived as a form of political solidarity. And as is the case with any act of solidarity, it must be thought of as a decision. It is to insist upon solidarity as a form of political engagement and an entanglement that demands distinction: One can only act in the cause of "freedom" if one is prepared to act against those who deny it, to act against those who understand their freedom as divisible from those of others—that is, those who believe that their freedom demands no solidarity of its own; those who believe that their freedom is sovereign, except when it is threatened from—and by—the articulations of "elsewhere." Those who do not, act when Palestinian academics are "'denied the right to move, to travel, and often to teach due to occupation policies'" (Gaines 70). Solidarity distinguishes in that it preempts the claim to radical singularity (the act of standing with) by articulating a political investment—an alliance—across or despite the "fact" of difference or distance. The latter represents simultaneously the geographical "fact" so effectively liquidated by the Derridean "elsewhere" as well as it acknowledges the political force of the "elsewhere." In this sense, solidarity constitutes the recognition of a politics-across/despite-distance and a politics-in-difference—as Butler's call for Jewish radical critique and Jewish political community through "dis-identification" demonstrates. Most importantly, it is only through division, by insisting on acting out of that "rift" that separates one mode of thinking, one mode of living, one mode of politics, from another, that a political solidarity worthy of the name can be sustained. Finally, solidarity is the act of standing firmly with one political entity, idea, or community after having stood decidedly against others—or, more particularly, the other politics.

The political imperative toward radical, distinctive solidarity shared in different measures by Derrida, Lawrence and Jad, and countless others, is that philosophical insight that demands that the general account for the specific—that the "specific facts" not be discounted, refused, or undermined, but engaged with because of their interrogative importance. Solidarity is that political bond that connects, both despite

and because of physical remove, the radical impulse that binds the “here” to “elsewhere”—it is, as Derrida insists, the “international aspect” that makes the “here” the political business, the cause, of the “elsewhere.” The political purchase and tenability of the “here” resides in the fact that it raises for the “elsewhere” precisely the questions—the political difficulties—that are already active in and troubling to and for the “elsewhere” itself. It is for this reason, crucial to understand (to render Derrida in the declarative), that “things will take place *elsewhere, too*” not only out of solidarity, but also out of a kind of political self-interest; the “here” animates, brings to political life issues that are, and have been, resonant within the “elsewhere.” Solidarity, then, is not (solely) the act of magnanimity or even distinction. Rather, it represents an instance of the Self addressing its political Self in the process of acting for, in the name of, the Other.

The power of “elsewhere” turns upon its duality: that is, its ability to make the “here” the subject of the political—in other words, its own political; and it also insists that the “indigeneity” of the “here” be politically recognized. The Palestinians, Israel, the condition of Palestinian life, and the ongoing consequences of Israeli state violence, are all concerns that cannot be kept to themselves because they imbricate the “elsewhere” in the “here.” Who are we to say that the promissory note to the Other is, even—or perhaps because of—in the act of solidarity, not also a purloined letter that is Self-addressed? That the promissory note is not also, in advance of its “sending out,” the autobiographical writing of the Self’s political? Any act of division constitutes, in this way, both a critique of and an intense commitment to political solidarity.

Notes

I would like to thank Matthew Abraham, Alyosha Goldstein, and Jane Juffer for their thoughtful reading of this essay.

¹ Baker removed Shlesinger and Tury from the board of these journals, which she and her husband publish, because of her commitment to boycotting Israeli institutions. Although Baker argued strenuously in the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper for a distinction between Israeli individuals and Israeli institutions, that is in truth a very distinction to uphold since the individual is always deeply located within the institution, be that the state or the university.

² Here and elsewhere in the essay I am using the term in Carl Schmitt’s sense of “the political,” that is, the specific arena and institution where politics takes place.

³ Ed. note: The African National Congress (ANC) started as a resistance movement in South Africa in the early part of the twentieth century. The organization, for a period of about thirty years, was banned in South Africa. During this time, the ANC appeared on the U.S. State Department Terrorist Watch list and remained there until the ANC assumed leadership of the South African Government in the 1990s. The U.S. and other Western nations used the “terrorist” designation to resist divestment from South Africa and to justify continued silence during the genocidal apartheid regime.

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